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Abstract
This historical study contributes to the research literature on advertising and competition by exploring professional thought and
economic theory as explanations for why advertisers might choose to compete in advertising and how combatively. Primary
and secondary sources consist of articles published in historic and contemporary advertising trade journals, such as Printers’ Ink
and Advertising Age. The findings reveal that during the first half of the twentieth century, statements and beliefs in favor of avoiding
competition were often consistent with both the informative economic view and the symbiotic competition associated with
expanding markets. During the past fifty to sixty years, however, findings show that the majority advocating more combative
advertising predominantly associated it with zero-sum competitive situations and described the use of advertising consistent with
the persuasive school of economic thought. Other findings support recent theory and research on combative advertising and both
micro- and macroeconomic causes and consequences of competition.
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A 1999 survey of 1800 U.S. corporate executives conducted by
the American Advertising Federation found that 83 percent
agreed advertising provides a competitive edge, with 29 percent
agreeing strongly. As Ulrich Doraszelski and Sarit Markovich
(2007, 557) observe, regarding this finding: ‘‘Practitioners, it
seems, presume that advertising is capable of giving them a
sustainable competitive advantage over their rivals.’’
Some historians, however, argue that neither advertisers nor
industry observers have always been so confident about the role
advertising plays in competition nor how combatively to com-
pete with it. As businessmen surveyed the marketing landscape
at the turn of the last century, at least three fundamental prob-
lems presented themselves. First, they noticed their advertising
often increased competitors’ sales as well as their own (Rowsome
1970). Advertisers had discovered the difference between
primary and selective demand and the competitive ‘‘free-rider
effect’’ (Krishnamurthy 2000).
Historian Daniel Pope (1983, 202) implies a second funda-
mental problem: ‘‘Winning public acceptance of advertising
demanded that advertising men deal truthfully with potential
customers. At the same time, the increasing importance of
demand-creating national advertising and the ambivalent atti-
tudes of national advertisers toward competition made proper
treatment of competitors a matter of great concern.’’ Similar
to the other ‘‘strategies of enticement’’ (Leach 1994, 37)
employed by early merchandisers—elaborate window displays,
color advertising trade cards, electrical outdoor signage, and
expanded forms of customer service—most also seemed to
favor constructive rather than combative advertising, the latter
of which identifies products but fails to expand markets
(Marshall, as cited in Chen et al. 2009). As Pope (1983, 201)
concludes, ‘‘Support for the idea of competition remained, but
it was defined as competition through advertising, not rivalry
in advertisements or attempts to undersell.’’
A third problem, related to the second, was the extent to
which competitors should be dealt with, or even acknowledged.
Many early businessmen and advertising professionals
condemned comparative, or what they called ‘‘knocking,’’
advertising. Although the use of comparative advertising was
infrequent during the first half of the twentieth century, it was
not completely absent. Richard Pollay (1985, 36), who
content-analyzed 2000 ads published in U.S. magazines from
1900 to 1980, found an average of 2 percent, when comparative
ads were operationalized as those including ‘‘clues’’ to the
identity of specific competitors . . . .’’ Pollay found none in the
1920s and 1930s and the most (at a mere 4 percent) in the 1970s.
Other research confirms the use of comparative advertising
in the United States expanded greatly in the 1960s and 1970s
(Beard and Nye, IN PRESS); it may be one of today’s most
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frequently employed tactics. Estimates of comparative
advertising use suggest it may be as high as 30 percent to
40 percent of all ads (Donthu 1992; Koten 1984; Neiman
1987; Stewart and Furse 1986). Although there have been no
recent content analyses of comparative advertising, some
observers suggest a steady increase during the first decade of
the twenty-first century (York 2009).
As mass marketing and modern advertising emerged during
the late nineteenth century—almost entirely as a result of large
increases in production made possible by continuous-process
manufacturing (Chandler 1977)—and continued to evolve
throughout the twentieth century, professional thought also
evolved in response to professional, social, economic, and reg-
ulatory contexts. These contexts suggest explanations for why
businessmen might choose to avoid or engage in aggressively
combative advertising.
Historians report that during the final decades of the nine-
teenth century, many businessmen remained skeptical as to the
value of advertising (Hower 1949; Laird 1998; Marchand
1985; Schudson 1989). Consequently, advertising agents pro-
moted its use through their trade journals, trade associations,
and clubs, as well as by expanding agency services to include
copy and art (McGovern 2006; Schudson 1989). At the same
time, many manufacturers of mass-produced consumer goods
were seeking to create national markets and wrest control of
their distribution channels from jobbers and merchants. These
exigencies also suggest why, when manufacturers and mer-
chandisers began employing mass advertising, their preference
would be for constructive rather than combative forms of it.
Professional thought regarding the purpose and attributes of
effective advertising might also influence beliefs regarding the
efficacy of combative advertising. Some historians suggest
many advertisers at the turn of the last century favored a
descriptive and emphatically rational approach due, in part,
to embarrassment over the frequently dishonest ‘‘bombast and
ballyhoo’’ and patent medicine advertising of the nineteenth
century (Beard 2004; Laird 1998; Rowsome 1970). The ‘‘Truth
Well Told’’ motto of the H.K. McCann Company, founded in
1911 (Alter 1995), clearly expresses such a philosophy.
Moreover, this period would not be the last time advertisers
would confront and respond to public criticism and advocates
of consumerism (Hower 1949; McGovern 2006). Beard and
Nye (IN PRESS) report that industry calls for the reform and
regulation of especially aggressive comparative advertising
peaked during two periods of pervasive consumerism—the
1930s (Fox 1984) and the 1970s (Pope 1983).
As the announcement advertising of the late nineteenth
century gave way to the belief advertising should persuade
(Hower 1949; Laird 1998), the professional debate turned to
the most appropriate way to accomplish it. During the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, many advertisers favored
selling directly by informing prospects about mainly tangible
features and benefits (Beard 2004). The informative school
of thought—or what is often called the ‘‘hard sell’’—is evident
in the ‘‘salesmanship-in-print’’ of John E. Kennedy, the
‘‘reason-why’’ of Albert Lasker, the ‘‘USP’’ of Rosser Reeves,
and characterizes much direct-response advertising of present
day (Beard 2004).
Yet the ‘‘soft sell,’’ with its emotional appeals and transfor-
mational consumer orientation, coexisted with the hard sell
throughout the twentieth century. It is evident in the influential
‘‘atmospheric’’ style of Theodore F. MacManus, the image-
based approach of Ernest E. Calkins, Leo Burnett’s ‘‘Inherent
Drama,’’ the ‘‘advertising-as-art-versus-science’’ philosophy
inspired by Bill Bernbach, and what was called ‘‘mood’’ or
‘‘image’’ advertising in the 1980s (Beard 2004). However, the
fear appeals employed during WWI and advertisers’ exploita-
tion of social taboos and personal anxieties in the 1930s
(Laird 1998; Marchand 1985; McGovern 2006; Rowsome
1970) demonstrate that, by then, the use of emotional appeals
was clearly no longer inconsistent with the hard sell.
Beard (2004) reports that the debate between hard and soft sell
proponents continued throughout the twentieth century and that
advertisers consistently argued the superiority of the hard sell
during difficult economic times.
Two schools of economic thought or views capture both the
professional debate over whether advertising should mainly
inform or persuade but also offer theoretical explanations for
why advertisers might choose to directly confront competitors
with aggressively combative advertising. The distinction
between persuasive and informative advertising can be found
in the economics literature as early as the 1920s (Veblen
1923) and 1930s (Burns 1936). The persuasive view—later
advanced in the works of Kaldor (1950), Bain (1956), and
Comanor and Wilson (1967)—views advertising as a means for
achieving power and avoiding competition on the basis of
price or quality. It holds advertising creates ‘‘spurious’’ product
differentiation (Chen et al. 2009, 2), brand loyalty, and barriers
to entry. Conversely, the informative view—developed in the
works of Stigler (1961), Telser (1964), and Nelson (1975)—
views advertising as a strategy by which advertisers might
increase demand by conveying information about price and
quality. It further holds that advertising constructively
encourages competition and facilitates entry.
Economic theory also suggests decisions regarding advertising
and competition might be influenced by the competitive situa-
tions advertisers believe they face. For example, and as Yoo
and Mandhachitara (2003, 312) observe: Zero-sum competi-
tion ‘‘is a competitive situation that most advertisers assume
to be the case and on which they base their budgets. In this type
of rivalry, the advertiser’s gain is the competitor’s loss because
the size of market remains fixed.’’ They further note that the
rivalry characterizing zero-sum competition occurs most often
in mature markets, where growth is static and advertisers
believe they can increase sales only by stealing them from
competitors. An assumption of this situation is that each
competitor’s advertising is inherently combative, increasing
its own sales while decreasing those of others.
On the other hand, the positive-sum competition typified by
‘‘symbiotic competition’’ occurs ‘‘when products involve
emerging technologies in new markets or when the market is
not fully matured and has much room for expansion’’ (Yoo and
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Mandhachitara 2003, 312). This situation assumes competitors
benefit from each other’s advertising. Two other competitive
situations—the ‘‘advertiser’s advantage’’ and the ‘‘competitor’s
advantage’’—account for other ways in which two competitors’
advertising might affect their own or each other’s sales.
To summarize, professional thought as to whether advertis-
ing should mainly inform or persuade, whether the sell should
be hard or soft, as well as economic theory all suggest explana-
tions for the evolution of professional thought regarding the
role of advertising in competition. Yet such explanations are
absent from the advertising, business, and economics research
literatures. Indeed, as Stigler (1968, 319) writes: ‘‘The sole test
of the usefulness of an economic theory is the concordance
between its predictions and the observable course of events.’’
Thus, the purpose of this study is to explore professional
thought and economic theory as explanations for why
advertisers during the past century have chosen whether or not
to compete directly in their advertising and how combatively.
Method and Topical Focus
Advertising histories (Fox 1984; Pope 1983; Presbrey 1929;
Rowsome 1970) and the literatures on comparative advertising
and competition were used during this study’s immersion and
guided entry phases. As described by Smith (1989, 319):
‘‘After immersion and consideration of the breadth of data
available in a general area of interest, the researcher focuses
on a more specific part of the data in a process called guided
entry. . . . In the process of guided entry, the historian further
delimits the data to be studied and the process of general ques-
tion forming begins.’’
The purposes of this study and the results of the immersion
and guided entry phases led to the following research ques-
tions: Why have some business managers and advertising
professionals chosen to avoid competing in advertising? Why
have others chosen to confront competitors combatively?
While the method does not offer the assessments of validity and
reliability that quantitative content analysis does, it is consis-
tent with the methods of traditional, humanistic historical
research. In other words, it is ‘‘a form of empirical inquiry that
uses theoretical constructs to attempt to make true statements
about the past’’ (Nord 1989, 292).
The collection of a database of professional thought on
competition and combative advertising began with a search
of the industry’s foremost trade journal, Printers’ Ink. Referred
to as ‘‘The Little Schoolmaster in the Art of Advertising’’ by its
editors and readers, the journal’s contributors consisted of both
participants in and firsthand observers of marketing and adver-
tising: businessmen, marketing executives, and advertising
professionals. Although the journal was published continu-
ously from 1888 to 1972, no index was available until 1913.
Thus, primary sources for the earliest period, 1900 to 1913,
were located by randomly selecting and scanning one issue
from each of the 60 volumes of Printers’ Ink published during
those years.
Sources for the remainder of the twentieth century through
present day were then identified by means of a literature search,
with the goal of collecting all trade journal articles (including
those published in Printers’ Ink) on the topics of comparative
advertising (as a proxy for ‘‘combative’’ advertising, since that
term was not used in the trade literature) and competition.
This search was aided by the existence of three business
periodical indices: the Industrial Arts Index (1913–1957), the
Business Periodicals Index (1958–1973), and the ABI/Inform
Complete search engine (1971–2009). The Industrial Arts
Index is the only business periodical index available for the
period it covers; it continued in 1958 as the Business Periodicals
Index. The data consist of some 140 articles that specifically
address the topic of competition, whether and how aggressively
to respond to it in advertising, and why.
Findings
Findings for the two research questions are organized chrono-
logically within each of two main sections. The second section
is also organized by dominant theme and then chronologically
within each theme. Representative observations and statements
of primary and secondary sources in each period support domi-
nant themes and subthemes. They are presented without rigid
periodization (Hollander et al. 2005) because no rationale
existed to impose it at the outset and none emerged inductively.
Avoiding Competition in Advertising
At the beginning of the twentieth century, many businessmen
argued that not only should competition in advertising be
avoided, competitors should be ignored. As one observed, the
businessman ‘‘cannot rule the weather and the crops, but he can
attack the items of neglect of business, extravagance, specula-
tion, and incompetence. And, when these black beasts are con-
sidered beside the relatively unimportant one of competition,
the average business man would better devote his time, energy,
and advertising space to relentless war upon them, leaving his
rivals to their own devices’’ (‘‘Is It Really Worth While . . . ’’
1902, 36). Printers’ Ink summarized the view concisely:
‘‘Talk success in your advertising, ignore competitors and
make your offering of vital interest to the people whose trade
you seek’’ (‘‘Talk Success in Your Advertising . . . ’’ 1903, 27).
The majority almost overwhelmingly agreed that competi-
tors were helpful. A Printers’ Ink author summarized the views
of many in his description of an advertising war between
steamship competitors. ‘‘It dawned upon both lines that it was
work meet [i.e., suitable or fitting] for even two advertisers to
educate the local public to travel more by water. The patronage
was not fixed; it could be increased as the public came to
understand the pleasures and the benefits of a trip by steamer’’
(Pickett 1910, 29). A manufacturer’s comments reflect the
same belief: ‘‘I never will forget how frightened many of us
were when other manufacturers began to exploit the system,
because we feared they would get all the business away from
us. What really happened was that the advertising which all the
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other systems did was a great help to us’’ (‘‘Competitive
Advertising Helps Business for All’’ 1914, 49).
During the first two decades of the twentieth century,
executives and industry observers who argued against compe-
tition in advertising expressed a similar and near-unanimous
confidence in market expansion. This was especially true of the
national marketers—the department stores, mail-order houses,
and chain stores—who were replacing wholesalers and smaller
retailers as the major distributors of goods in the United States
(Chandler 1977). The belief advertising contributed primarily
to market expansion was summarized well by the California
Railroad Commission: ‘‘Modern advertising is creative; it pro-
duces demand and brings new business. . . . The great success in
market expansion that has attended the advertising campaigns of
cooperative farm groups, such as the raisin, citrus, prune, and
peach associations, may be accepted as proof. Merely taking
trade away from a competitor without developing new business
is a quite negligible feature of modern advertising’’ (as cited in
‘‘California Power Company . . . ’’ 1922, 80).
Advertisers of the day often referred to cooperative advertis-
ing as ‘‘educational,’’ reflecting their conviction that they were
teaching people how to live better lives (Laird 1998;
McGovern 2006). It was also a frequent topic of discussion
in the trade literature of the 1920s; Printers’ Ink had already
described over 200 cooperative campaigns as of 1920 (‘‘What
Has Been Done . . . ’’ 1920). Describing one such campaign, a
Printers’ Ink author argued: ‘‘If competitors can thus hurriedly
get together and speak their piece so effectively, what excuse is
there for holding back the many co-operative, industrial,
governmental and public betterment stories?’’ (‘‘Competitors
Jointly Advertise . . . ’’ 1921, 62). Indeed, as Leach (1994)
reports, such cooperative relationships were common among
department stores in the 1920s.
Faith in the value of cooperation among competitors was
summarized well in the comments of long-time Printers’ Ink
editor C. B. Larrabee (1923, 117): ‘‘No, it is not possible to
guard a sales or advertising plan from the zealous eyes of the
competitor. That may seem a devastating statement but it is
true, nevertheless. Since it is true the manufacturer must ask
himself what is the answer. The answer, fortunately, is simple.
It lies in a new attitude toward competition, a new understanding
of what competition really means, a realization that competition
is more apt to be constructive than destructive.’’
As the Depression wore on, there were signs advertisers were
growing more combative. As Printers’ Ink (‘‘Competitive
Claims’’ 1936, 8) pointed out: ‘‘Advertisers of a considerable
list of commodities . . . seem to be outdoing each other in unfair,
unethical, and even untruthful competitive claims. This sort of
thing, to state the case with great restraint, is bad for the adver-
tiser.’’ An example from the period—a follow-up to what
agency Cunningham and Walsh’s President Anthony C. Che-
vins (1975, 34) called the ‘‘grand-daddy’’ of all comparative ads,
Walter Chrysler’s ‘‘Look at all Three!’’—is shown in Figure 1.
Still, the majority argued in favor of mainly constructive and
mostly noncombative advertising. One advertiser told Printers’
Ink what happened when he abandoned a comparative
campaign: ‘‘ . . . we threw out all comparison and began to
confine ourselves to direct statement of what our material
would do. . . . Competitors have appeared—new as well as
old—and they are all doing a satisfactory volume of business.
Most of them are advertising. But the market has grown more
rapidly than the combined output. A great deal of this is directly
attributable to constructive advertising’’ (McGarry 1931, 28).
Printers’ Ink columnist ‘‘Groucho’’ (1934, 57) similarly
condemned combative advertising: ‘‘Advertising is all set to
leap ahead, if it can get rid of this nonsense. You’ve got to chum
with competitors as well as customers to have good times.’’
Faith in a constructive role for advertising and its contribu-
tion to primary demand held steady throughout the Depression
and appeared to actually grow stronger toward the end. Many
such statements included criticisms of overly combative adver-
tisers. As W. L. Rech (1935, 38), an executive with the
H. E. Lesan Advertising Agency, wrote: ‘‘Too many advertis-
ing and merchandising men apparently still cling to the belief
that he profits most who serves most efficiently to kick his
competitors off the ladder. There are far too few in this work
who realize the ultimate advantage to industrial cooperation,
in plugging the whole field of which they are a unit.’’ Larrabee
(1934, 59) argued the same point: ‘‘As industry enters a period
of recovery it is co-operatively important that manufacturers
consider any developments which seem to retard the growth
of their industries. In many cases it can be pretty clearly proved
that highly competitive advertising is a retarding factor and
deserves consideration along with all other similar factors.’’
Ralph Starr Butler, vice president of the General Foods
Corporation and author of the first marketing textbook, sum-
marized the concerns of many regarding the proliferation of
comparative and excessively combative advertising and linked
it to rising consumerism. He warned that it could ‘‘easily result
in public disgust with advertising as a business tool;’’ or, worse
yet, ‘‘lend emphasis to the contentions of those who want to
place advertising in the hands of bureaucratic governmental
control and bring about that distinctly undesirable condition’’
(as cited in ‘‘Calls for Showdown on Competitive Copy’’
1931, 105).
Beliefs in favor of ignoring competitors and criticisms of the
Depression’s combative advertising continued into the 1940s
and 1950s. Praising an enlightened client, Federal Advertising
Agency President Robert Tinsman (1941, 64) wrote:
‘‘He ignores the quantity-value claims of his competitor as
beneath his notice. . . . This is no time for destructive advertising
battles. . . . There is such a thing as constructive competition—
the ‘life of the trade’—and advertising should be first to practice
it.’’ ‘‘Aesop Glim’’ (Printers’ Ink columnist George Laflin
Miller) agreed: ‘‘Old Aesop Glim believes that—more often than
not—it is sound practice to ignore your competition. Omit all ref-
erence to competitive wares when writing about the features of
your wares. Tell your own story—exclusively, positively—give
your copy sound construction, sequence and conviction—and
you’ll get your share of the market’’ (1945, 25). J. Walter
Thompson’s Joseph Stone (1951, 130) spoke for many when he
wrote: ‘‘ . . . if you study the record you’ll find that many an
390 Journal of Macromarketing 31(4)
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016jmk.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Figure 1. ‘‘You’re Right, Mr. Chrysler!’’ 1932. Source: The New York Times, April 20, 1932, 10. (Dodge is a registered trademark of Chrysler LLC.)
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advertiser who turned from quality in favor of black, dirty
headlines and throat cutting policies came to rue the day.’’
The belief competitors should be ignored almost disappeared
from the literature in the second half of the twentieth century.
When it was mentioned, it was almost always linked to an
advertiser’s superior market position. As Lawrence Light, a
vp-director of research for agency BBDO, told Advertising Age
(‘‘Unsolicited Ad Idea Problems . . . ’’ 1975, 3): ‘‘We know of
no psychological theory that suggests that a leader will benefit
from naming a competitor.’’ Brock Luther (1982, 93), a Direct
Marketing columnist, summarized this view: ‘‘Here’s what
I’ve discovered about tackling the competition in direct mail.
. . . If you’re the leader by a large margin, forget your compe-
tition exists.’’ A differing statement, however, was offered to
explain a spate of attack advertising among business publica-
tions. As W. Donald Larson, director of communications for
Forbes, told Advertising Age: ‘‘Business Week carries more ads
than anyone else, and when you are No. 1, you have to find
somewhere to grow’’ (Emmrich 1982, M1).
Competing in Advertising
Consistent with the widespread belief during the first decade of
the twentieth century that competitors should be ignored, not a
single source during the same period argued they should be
confronted combatively. Beginning with the 1920s, however,
the data reveal several competitive contingencies that involved
combative advertising. Some of these episodes occurred in
expanding markets. However, when sources discussed or advo-
cated competing aggressively in advertising, the majority, by
far, described markets characterized by zero-sum competition.
‘‘The Substitution Menace.’’ Even as most markets expanded
during the first two decades of the twentieth century, adverti-
sers still faced the free-rider problem Printers’ Ink dubbed
‘‘The Substitution Menace.’’ After building primary demand,
advertisers would discover often-inferior brands substituted for
theirs—sometimes inadvertently, but often purposely—by job-
bers and retailers. A sample from Printers’ Ink’s lengthy war
on substitution is shown in Figure 2.
One advertiser, writing anonymously (1925, 113) in
Printers’ Ink, blamed advertising for his substitution problem:
‘‘Our hope of large future growth, general distribution through
national advertising, volume production, and lowered manu-
facturing costs is based on the home market. How are we to
reach that market effectively with consumer advertising, when
advertising attracts cheap competition which takes our market
away from us about as rapidly as we create it?’’
The majority, however, proposed advertising was the solution
for substitution. As Printers’ Ink contributor H. E. Agnew (1920,
154) wrote: ‘‘ . . . the better the product is known, and the more
confidence the public has in the manufacturer because it knows
his advertising and his goods, the more difficult it is for the com-
petition to break into the field.’’ Editor Larrabee (1923, 112)
agreed: ‘‘When you get a new idea broadcast it. In this way you
steal a march on your competitors and put it up to them to stamp
themselves as imitators.’’ Kraft Cheese Co.’s John H. Kraft (1927,
142) advocated brand-building advertising: ‘‘We avoided saying
‘Insist on the Kraft label’ or ‘Beware of Substitutes.’ We felt that
the buying public had been surfeited with that sort of tarnished
warning until it had lost its force. So we try in our copy to
lead the reader into realizing what our name on a package
of cheese stands for.’’
The New Competition. Along with the expanding markets and
cooperative advertising campaigns of the 1920s, a new role for
combative advertising emerged. Dubbed ‘‘The New Competi-
tion’’ by American Tobacco’s George Washington Hill, F. J.
Rose (1924, 10) summarized the idea in a Printers’ Ink piece:
‘‘Competition today takes on broader dimensions to those man-
ufacturers and retailers who look below the surface. It doesn’t
do the house furnishing store any good if a family spends more
than it needs to at the grocers and less than it ought to at the
house furnishing store.’’ Printers’ Ink (‘‘The Real Battle of the
Century’’ 1928, 118) offered a description four years later:
‘‘The wise future pickers in advertising have, for some time,
been predicting that the great competitive struggle in advertis-
ing is to be shifted; that when an industry is selling to consumer
Figure 2. ‘‘Another Case of Substitution.’’ Source: Printers’ Ink, 1902,
42 (9): 20.
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capacity, instead of competition between members of that
industry, we shall see the whole industry competing with other
industries for a still greater market.’’
George Washington Hill, in fact, attributed his highly
successful and controversial ‘‘Reach for a Lucky instead of a
sweet’’ campaign to The New Competition. ‘‘Anyone who does
not recognize that our campaign merely acknowledges that
competition today is industry against industry, quite as much,
or more than, within industries, is not up on the trend of modern
advertising. Examples of this competition are shown by the
radio and the phonograph; the motor bus and the railroads;
mechanical refrigeration and the ice-box . . . ’’ (as cited in Pharo
1928, 83).
Progress and product quality. A steady stream of new and
improved products during the early twentieth century led some
advertisers to conclude that competition, and, in some cases,
combative advertising, were inevitable. As one Printers’ Ink
contributor observed: ‘‘No one will deny the right of the maker
of an improved article to call very special attention to the addi-
tion which puts his product in a class by itself. Such advertising
is really another form of ‘competition’’’ (Leach 1924,
137–138). Industry leader Joel Benton (1932, 53) similarly
argued: ‘‘When a mechanical advance is made in a product
there is no reason why the advertiser should not make the most
of it, compared with the old-fashioned way. That’s the kind of
competition we want; it gives life to advertising—makes it very
helpful to the consumer. . . . You cannot abolish competitive
advertising without abolishing advertising itself; it is the most
efficacious kind.’’
Similar statements linking competitive advertising and prod-
uct quality appeared in later decades. As Stanley Tannenbaum
(1976a, 28), chairman of agency Kenyon & Eckhardt, wrote:
‘‘I hail comparative advertising as our industry’s own brand of
consumerism, when properly executed. . . . Moreover, it serves
as an incentive for advertisers to produce better products.’’
Dwight Davis, a vp-creative director at Kenyon & Eckhardt and
contestant in the combative auto industry of the 1980s, argued the
same point: ‘‘It motivates the advertiser to improve his products
or suffer a bad comparison’’ (as cited in McClain 1983, M1).
Competition in expanding markets. Sources describe several
outbreaks of combative advertising in rapidly growing markets.
For instance, despite a steady increase in cigarette consumption
during the 1920s, R. J. Reynolds, Liggett & Myers, American
Tobacco, and P. Lorillard fought damaging advertising and
price wars. Historically, cigarette marketing had always been
advertising-intensive because high volume and low prices
meant there was little room for price-cutting (Chandler
1977). As described by Sales Management (‘‘How the
‘Big Four’ Cigarette Advertisers Stand . . . ’’ 1929, 592):
‘‘The scramble for increasing shares of the rich cigarette lode
has been attended by great advertising campaigns and a retail
price war of exceptional sharpness.’’ Some linked the hostility
to P. Lorillard’s attempt to enter the market with Old Golds and
steal sales from the big three brands (one of these combative
ads is shown in Figure 3). Consistent with other views from the
1920s, some were critical: ‘‘The real explanation of the price
cut is rather to be found in that same ill, which today besets
so many of our great industries in acute form: excessive com-
petition’’ (Beecher 1928, 114).
A similar episode occurred in the 1970s. As overall wine
sales grew, Coca-Cola Co. employed a combative campaign for
Taylor California Cellars. As Business Week (‘‘Creating a Mass
Market for Wine’’ 1982) noted, the U.S. wine market at the
time was dominated, like the cigarette industry of forty years
earlier, by a few large competitors. The campaign more than
doubled sales from 1,500,000 cases in 1979 to 3,800,000 in
1980—an outcome two industry observers referred to as
‘‘unheard of performance for a new brand’’ (Shanken and
Drum 1981, S-38). However, within a few years, the damage
caused by the campaign had become obvious: ‘‘The resulting
marketing war proved expensive and drove down the profits
Figure 3. Old Gold Lions. Source: The New York Times, May 28, 1928,
20. (Old Gold Cigarettes is a registered trademark of Lorillard
Licensing Company, LLC.).
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of everyone competing in the premium jug wine segment—
including Coca-Cola which spent lavishly to become the third
largest wine marketer in the industry . . . ’’ (Stroud 1985, 17).
In the 1990s, a Pepsi-Lipton Tea Partnership targeted Snap-
ple Beverage Corp. with a combative campaign. A beverage
industry observer reported: ‘‘At stake is one of the fastest-
growing segments in the overall sluggish soft-drink market.
When all the yearend numbers are tallied, Beverage Marketing
predicts, iced tea sales will have grown 80% to a $900 million
segment at wholesale’’ (Magiera 1993, 48). At the same time,
telecommunications companies were also waging war over
expanding markets. As one source explained: ‘‘Telecommuni-
cations usage is exploding worldwide, via new usage surging
for telephone lines carrying voice, data, facsimile, cellular and
wireless signals’’ (Fitzgerald 1993, 12). These combatants
would also ultimately conclude the war was futile, at least as
far as long-distance services were concerned. Efforts to differ-
entiate parity offerings merely created what Brandweek
described as ‘‘ . . . ‘the spinner,’ something of a hybrid of a
switcher and a price buyer that changes long-distance carriers
as often as every three months’’ (Koprowski 1995, 22).
Two ads from this period, which were published on the same
day in major U.S. newspapers, are shown in Figures 4 and 5.
Recession, slow-growth markets, and zero-sum competition.
Although the data reveal some instances in which advertising
was used combatively in expanding markets, the majority who
spoke and wrote about advertising and competition referenced
situations characterized by zero-sum competition. The first
appeared in 1939. Charles Luckman (1939, 18), vice president
and general manager of the Pepsodent Company, described the
zero-sum competition he perceived among toothpastes: ‘‘Years
ago when there was very little competition in the dentifrice
field, Pepsodent’s advertising could be more general. At that
time Pepsodent meant ‘toothpaste.’ Now, the advertising must
make Pepsodent mean a specific kind of toothpaste with
features not possessed by other brands . . . . Our advertising,
therefore, necessarily must be competitive. . . . Every time one
Figure 4. AT&T Attack. Source: The Wall Street Journal, April 8, 1993, B8-B9 (AT&T is a registered trademark of AT&T INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY II, L.P.).
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Figure 5. MCI Attack. Source: The Wall Street Journal, April 8, 1993, B3 (MCI is a registered trademark of MCI Communications Corporation.).
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brand of dentifrice shows a gain some other brand shows
losses.’’
Other examples appeared in the literature from the 1940s
and 1950s. When the World War II rationing of meat, fats, and
cheese went into effect, for instance, creating an artificial
zero-sum competitive situation, Printers’ Ink Monthly (‘‘Meat,
Fat and Cheese Firms Compete . . . .’’ 1943, 58) reported:
‘‘Now the controls of rationing cause competitive selling
among brands and types of products to be in order again.’’
Similarly, as post–World War II consumer spending began to
level off, J. Walter Thompson’s Joseph Stone (1951, 81)
observed: ‘‘But now that business is back to the normal condi-
tion of a buyer’s market, the old cry is heard again: ‘Let’s make
our ads more competitive.’’’
In the 1950s, a major scandal occurred over false compara-
tive price advertising. Comparative advertising also became a
strident issue in the trade press of the 1960s and, especially, the
1970s, after the U.S. Federal Trade Commission persuaded
TV networks to implement a one-year trial. However, with one
exception, advertisers never linked their use of combative or
comparative advertising with the competitive situations they
believed they faced. The exception was Kenyon & Eckhardt’s
Stanley Tannenbaum. Noting that ‘‘consumerism’’ often
‘‘manifests itself as a result of the economic dislocation, when
prices rise and incomes go down for a significant proportion of
the population,’’ he pointed to the desirability of comparative
advertising. ‘‘There are innumerable marketing and advertising
techniques to capitalize on this ‘show’ me attitude which has
developed among information-hungry consumers . . . . One of
the best ways is to provide information for which consumers
are searching and to keep in step with consumerism through the
use of comparative advertising’’ (1976b, 1).
However, throughout the remainder of the twentieth century
and into the twenty-first, the majority repeatedly linked both
combative and comparative advertising with zero-sum compe-
tition. As combative advertising broke out in the beverage, fast
food, and automotive industries in the early 1980s, sources time
and again referenced recession and static demand. Describing a
Burger King comparative campaign, two observers noted:
‘‘Like soft-drink companies, fast-food marketers are dealing
with a slow-growth industry, where market share gains are the
driving force behind any expansion’’ (Kreisman and Marshall
1982, 1). William M. Lane, a J. Walter Thompson vp-
creative director responsible for the Ford Motor Co. account,
similarly observed: ‘‘Each of the companies is fighting for a
bigger share of a smaller pie. The key word is ‘fighting.’ If a
customer is not going to buy our car, he’s going to buy someone
else’s’’ (as cited in McClain 1983, M1). Indeed, automotive
advertising at the time was so combative, the makers of a
Toyota TV spot featuring ‘‘the blowing up of a generic American
station wagon’’ (Serafin 1985, 76) missed what would appear to
be a fairly obvious thematic connection to the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor.
During this period, several subthemes emerged: a growing
prevalence of ‘‘me-too’’ products, a subsequent need for prod-
uct differentiation, and the perceived failure of brand-building
image advertising. An analyst with an investment banking firm
specializing in the fast-food industry summarized these
themes: ‘‘Both Burger King and No. 3-ranked Wendy’s duti-
fully tried image-building campaigns recently. . . . As menus
increasingly collide with those of their competitors, it’s more
difficult to establish product differentiation via the product
itself. You have to establish it through advertising and promo-
tion’’ (as cited in Winters 1986, 3).
In the 1990s, combative advertising was prevalent in many
product categories. In almost every instance, sources described
intensely competitive markets characterized by their perception
of zero-sum competition. The view was summarized well by
BBDO/LA CEO Steve Hayden: ‘‘In a recession year, with
everyone in a blackened mood, we’ll see harsher competition
because everyone’s struggling for market position’’ (as cited
in Jaben 1992, 36). Another observer of the technology indus-
try similarly noted: ‘‘Stuck with lookalike products and facing
an industry shakeout, personal computer marketers are wont to
run comparison advertising, often with nasty jabs at rivals
to accentuate any differences in product, price or service’’
(Johnson 1993, 1).
During the 2000s, sources consistently linked combative
and comparative advertising to recession, parity products,
brand differentiation, and the failure of image campaigns.
Describing a return to combative advertising among technol-
ogy marketers, Chris Wall, a creative director with agency
Ogilvy & Mather, told Advertising Age: ‘‘There’s always this
sense of softness, like branding is somehow soft . . . In hard
times, the units get smaller and the ads get shriller’’ (as cited
in Wasserman 2001, 8). Jack Trout, coauthor of Positioning
and president of Trout & Partners, similarly noted: ‘‘When hard
times hit, the singing, dancing and emotional ads go out the
window, and clients say, ‘How do I nail my competitor?’’’
(as cited in Vranica 2008). And describing a campaign challen-
ging Walmart on its technology prices and expertise, Best
Buy’s chief marketing officer Barry Judge told Advertising
Age: ‘‘If you can’t grow as easily because the markets are not
necessarily going up, you’ve got to play for share, and when
people are playing for share, they’re getting more aggressive
in their messaging’’ (as cited in Zmuda 2009).
Desperation. Although often, but not always, linked with
zero-sum competitive situations, combative advertising was
frequently associated with a desperate need to stall declining
sales or a competitor’s success. For instance, VW’s popularity
in the 1960s made the automaker a frequent target. As an
Advertising Age contributor explained, ‘‘Everybody in the for-
eign car market is trying to cut Volkswagen down to size. . . .
The reason for this blasé reaction is seen in the fact that two-
thirds of the more than 500,000 foreign cars sold in this country
last year were Volkswagens’’ (Meyers 1966, 4). The war
against VW produced a unique ad on behalf of a Texas AMC
dealer group (see Figure 6). As Advertising Age (‘‘Texas
Rambler Dealer Strikes Back at VW . . . ’’ 1968, 14) described
it: ‘‘Tongue-in-cheek copy (all in German except for one small
paragraph) suggests ‘Der Amerikanische Wagen’ has appeal to
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Figure 6. Texas Rambler Dealers. Source: The Dallas Times-Herald, August 22, 1968.
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Germans for the same reasons that some imports appeal to
Americans—outstanding engineering, and dependable and
economic transportation. The paragraph in English says,
‘If you lived in Germany you would probably be charmed.’’’
In later decades, sources describing combative and com-
parative campaigns also consistently linked them with sales
declines or the success of a competitor. Describing the Burger
Wars of the 1980s, two observers noted: ‘‘Desperate to resusci-
tate its growth momentum, Burger King Corp. is hitching its
company fortunes to a massive comparative marketing cam-
paign, replete with ‘Pepsi challenge’-style taste-test research,
that takes on both industry-leader McDonald’s and Wendy’s
International’’ (Kreisman and Marshall 1982, 1). Judann
Dagnoli (1989, 4), Advertising Age contributor and observer
of a war between rival spaghetti sauces, similarly reported:
‘‘Lurking behind Ragu Foods’ complaints about Campbell
Soup Co.’s comparative ads for Prego spaghetti sauce is a slow
but sure drop in Ragu’s market share.’’
The same theme was evident in many other product
categories. Describing Miller Brewing’s decision, once again,
to abandon brand-building image campaigns in favor of more
combative ones, a contributor to Advertising Age noted:
‘‘Miller Brewing is trying to discover its inner Pepsi as it plans
to resume its anti-Bud approach to marketing in the hope of
regaining sales and share momentum’’ (Mullman 2006, 3).
As soup advertising turned combative again in 2008, an indus-
try observer described the cause of a Campbell’s attack on
Progresso: ‘‘General Mills’ Progresso Light soups were a big
hit in 2007, in part because of a Weight Watchers endorsement
that gave the line a zero-point rating (that’s good). . . . Now, at
the beginning of soup season, Campbell is on the attack’’
(Wong 2008). In 2009, Mead Johnson Nutrition was ordered
by a federal court to pay $13.5 million in damages to competi-
tor PBM Products for misleading consumers with a compara-
tive ad campaign. Citing U.S. District Court Judge James
Spencer, Advertising Age reported that ‘‘the outcome of the
case was the result of Mead Johnson choosing to run an attack
ad campaign due to waning sales’’ (Parekh 2009).
Discussion and Conclusions
This study’s findings support an overall conclusion that the
beliefs of business executives and advertising professionals
regarding why they chose to avoid or confront competitors
combatively often reflected both professional thought regard-
ing message strategy and outcomes predictable from economic
theory. During much of the first half of the twentieth century,
for instance, professional thought in favor of avoiding compe-
tition was clearly a response to the symbiotic competition asso-
ciated with expanding markets. It is also substantially
consistent with the belief that effective and persuasive advertis-
ing predominantly informs.
Beliefs and practices during this period are also mostly
consistent with outcomes predicted by the informative view.
Advertising was often described as a means for constructively
and cooperatively growing markets and conveying information
about the attributes of products and, especially, improvements
in quality. Time and again, advertisers acknowledged and even
expressed satisfaction with the ease of entry available to
competitors, as long as their products were not notably inferior.
It seems especially striking that such beliefs remained preva-
lent during the Great Depression. On the other hand, the belief
manufacturers could successfully combat ‘‘The Substitution
Menace’’ by differentiating their brands and creating barriers
to entry are consistent with outcomes based on the persuasive
view. The same could be said for the frequent, and much
criticized, exploitation of the emotional hard sell during the
Depression.
During the past fifty to sixty years, findings reveal that those
who advocated, or at least admitted to, a combative role for
advertising consistently referenced zero-sum competitive
situations. Advertisers also described becoming increasingly
combative during periods of recession. This finding supports
Yoo and Mandhachitara’s (2003) conclusion that most adverti-
sers assume they are facing a zero-sum competitive situation.
Beliefs and practices during this latter period, however, are
predominantly consistent with the hard sell (with both rational
and emotional appeals) and outcomes predictable from the
persuasive view. Advertisers repeatedly described advertising
as a means for differentiating products and brands, maintaining
brand loyalty, and stealing sales from competitors. They also
consistently advocated abandoning brand-image advertising
(i.e., the soft sell) and launching combative campaigns, instead,
when competition intensified. This finding is in line with those
of Beard (2004, 2010), who found that advertisers frequently
favor the hard sell during difficult economic times and that
comparative advertising wars often break out during periods
of intense competition. Indeed, the findings of this study sup-
port an overall conclusion that aggressively combative adver-
tising is likely perceived by advertisers to be the hardest sell
of all.
These broad findings and other more specific ones support
some of the most recent contributions to the literature on adver-
tising and competition. For example, advocates of cooperative
and constructive campaigns during the first three decades of the
twentieth century reflect the well-established view that generic
advertising is especially effective early in the product life
cycle. A related finding, that the majority of advertisers during
the same period advocated responding to the free-rider substi-
tution problem with noncombative advertising emphasizing
mainly product quality, is consistent with the findings of a
recent study of free-riding in generic advertising. As Frank
Bass and his colleagues (2005, 565) conclude: ‘‘ . . . although
there is free-riding, the stronger firm is better off tolerating this
free-riding because this does not affect its long-term profitabi-
lity greatly.’’ Such a finding is also consistent with the widely
held belief that market leaders should rarely, if ever, attack
smaller competitors (Beard 2008).
Frequent criticisms of aggressive competition and comba-
tive advertising are consistent with other recent studies. Yuxin
Chen and his colleagues (2009) analyzed the effects of comba-
tive advertising on market power and concluded that it can, as
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predicted by the persuasive view, reduce price competition to
benefit competing firms. However, they also concluded that
if combative advertising leads to indifferent consumers, rather
than partisan ones (e.g., one of the outcomes of the long-
distance war of the early 1990s), it could also lead to procom-
petitive outcomes where both firms become collectively worse
off. This outcome certainly explains why sources later in the
twentieth century and during the first decade of the twenty-
first century often expressed regret that they abandoned more
constructive brand-building image campaigns and disappoint-
ment in the factors that led to it. It is also consistent with
Beard’s (2010) finding that advertising wars often produce
mutually damaging consequences and that advertisers who
engage in them often regret it.
Perhaps most important, another finding supports recent
theoretical work on ‘‘ruinous competition’’ and its micro- and
macroeconomic effects. Nina Shapiro (2005) argues that while
perfect competition can lead to welfare benefits such as lower
prices, it can also cause higher costs, lower wages, job cuts,
industry consolidations, and bankruptcies. As she further
argues: ‘‘It will reduce aggregate demand, as will the disruption
of the industry investment, and instead of stimulating the econ-
omy, the competition of the industry could bring on a down-
turn, with the fall in the wage bill of the industry decreasing
the sales of other industries, and the fall in their sales pressing
prices down and thus reducing their wages and employment.
A ruinous competition could become a ‘ruinous’ deflation’’
(543). Criticisms of combative advertising during and immedi-
ately after the Depression and beliefs in favor of constructive
advertising suggest businessmen recognized a causal link
between demand and profitability for individual firms at the
microeconomic level and aggregate demand and employment
at the macroeconomic level.
Future historical research on competition in advertising
could helpfully replicate and extend this study’s findings by
comparing them to other primary and secondary sources, such
as works written by prominent advertising professionals (e.g.,
Bates 1896; Calkins 1922; Cone 1969; Reeves 1961; Young
1944), biographies of relevant business leaders (e.g., Curcio
2000; Durden 2003), and industry-specific historical works
(e.g., Dregni and Miller 1996; Pennock 2007; Walsh 2000).
In addition, this study revealed the occasional use of combative
and comparative advertising in expanding markets, but little
explanation for it. Understanding how prevalent this phenom-
enon is would extend this study’s findings in a useful direction,
especially since it appears that such combative campaigns may
often have particularly detrimental consequences. Finally,
future research could explore at greater depth what business
executives and advertising professionals hoped to accomplish
with aggressive comparative advertising. This study’s findings,
as well as Beard’s (2010), show advertisers often criticized
combative advertising, while simultaneously engaging in it.
When and for what purposes did they believe it would be effec-
tive? Did these beliefs change over time? Moreover, are they
consistent with the findings reported in the substantial body
of empirical research on comparative advertising?
Study Limitations
The findings and conclusions of this study are limited in several
ways. As noted earlier, although the method is consistent with
traditional historical research, it lacks the means for establishing
the validity and reliability of, for instance, quantitative content
analysis. This study is also limited by its sources. Advertising
trade journals—including, especially, Printers’ Ink—have
proven valuable for previous important historical research
(e.g., Curti 1967). However, there is no doubt a disparity
between what advertisers say and what they actually do. This
study revealed at least one example of such a disparity regarding
the apparent frequent use of combative advertising during the
Depression and the almost universal condemnation of it. In addi-
tion, sources for some periods are somewhat limited, mainly in
that the statements of some advertisers were inevitably filtered
by the reporters who cited them.
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